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The Uruguay Round is closing this week after a marathon of
negotiations stretching well over seven years; so the timing of this
Panel is exquisite from my viewpoint. The ceremony, besides, is in
Marrakesh, an exotic place that sets our minds racing with thoughts
of Casablanca, Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman. Indeed, one
can imagine a movie being made of this historic occasion with Peter
Ustinov cast as Peter Sutherland, the brilliant and portly new
Director General of the GATT who finally brought the Round to
successful conclusion, Dustin Hoffman playing our own inimitable
Mickey Kantor, and perhaps Al Pacino as the elegant and suave Sir
Leon Brittan of the European Union: the three principal players in the
closing days of the Round.
In any event, the closure of the Round puts the GATT, or its
new version the WTO, right at the center of the world trading
system. This is a triumph that should not be underestimated. It was
only a few years ago that my good friend Lester Thurow, reading the
mood around him, had pronounced at Davos that the GATT was dead.
His colleague at MIT, Rudiger Dornbusch, had urged that the GATT be
killed. And their brilliant MIT colleague and my justly renowned
pupil, Paul Krugman, before his celebrated recent return to the fold
of free trade and multilateralism, had flirted with both thoughts:
evidently, the company you keep affects you. Fortunately, this anti-
GATT MIT School, (christened by me as the Memorial Drive School
since MIT's famous Economics department is located at Memorial
Drive in Cambridge, while the phrase also evokes aptly the funereal
view of the GATT that the School epitomized) seems today to be
more obviously silly than when some of us pronounced on its
demerits some years ago.1 That School's demise and GATT's success
are a cause for celebration. So is President Clinton's belated but
strong support for the Round, though we must still see him take the
agreement skillfully through Congress in the coming year.
All this is on the positive side of the ledger. But there are also
problems that lie ahead, which threaten the world trading system in
varying degrees, where careful examination is warranted. I will
touch on just two of the central problems confronting us today.
(1) Income-Distribution Concerns and Reverse S & D for Developing
Countries:
Among the danger points currently is the increasing
preoccupation in the European Union and in the United States with
the distributional effects of freer trade with the developing
countries. A new North-South divide is opening up, in consequence.
Traditionally, economists have had to fight the "pauper labour"
argument against free trade by the North with the South. This
argument asserts that trading with cheaper-labour countries will
harm a country's overall economic welfare; in reality, the case for
free trade is proof against this charge. But the new fear is not that
trading with countries with paupers will harm oneself; rather it is
that such trade will produce more paupers in one's own midst. In
. Jag dish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk, Princeton University
Press: Princeton, 1991, Chapter 1 and Appendix I. z
other words, the fear is that our proletariat, the unskilled, will be
immiserized by freer trade with the poor countries of the South.
This fear comes from the experience of the 1980s when, in EU,
unemployment increased and, in the US, the real wages of the
unskilled fell. While nearly all careful studies show that the cause
was overwhelmingly the outbreak of technical change that was
unskilled-labour-saving, and that North-South trade had very little
to do with this distressing reality, the fear that trade was the culprit
has become widespread.1
In fact, you will recall that the debate over NAFTA was
particularly acrimonious precisely because the unions were petrified
that it would lead to job losses and decline in the real wages of the
US workers. One could plausibly argue that, just because many
Americans had this stark image of Mexico as a source of pauper
labour that was illegally coming across in large numbers and
depressing the wages of our unskilled workers, and because they
intuitively felt that free trade with Mexico would simply be an
indirect way in which this would happen via imports of goods made
with cheap labour, a most unfortunate effect of NAFTA was to
exacerbate these fears and to undermine the political case for free
trade. This would not have happened with the Uruguay Round
because freer trade with the developing countries would have been
alongside the many other issues negotiated at the Round.2 Indeed,
a detailed analytical and empirical analysis of this question, see Jagdish
Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia "Freer Trade and Real Wages of the Unskilled: Is
Marx Striking Again?" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Marvin Kosters (ed.), Trade
and Wages. American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., 1994.
2The British debate at the time of the enactment of the 1905 Immigration quota
legislation, the first national legislation of its kind, happened to divide the
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this debate has not surfaced in the same way, and with the same
passion, in that context to date.
I suspect that this fear of freer trade with the South, no matter
how exaggerated, will dominate trade policy through the rest of this
millennium. The effect will be precisely what we observed in the
case of NAFTA: attempts at linking cost-raising issues somehow with
trade liberalization with the developing countries. Thus, attempts
were made then, and conceded in spirit though without serious teeth,
to raise Mexico's minimum wages, to raise her labour standards, and
to improve her industry's environmental standards as well.
The GATT is similarly under pressure to adopt measures to
harmonize up the environmental and labor standards in developing
countries; and attempts have begun in earnest, with the United
States teaming up with France (that great ally of ours on trade, as
you will recall from the disputes we had over EU agriculture and
audio-visual services at the Round) to push a Social Clause onto the
GATT. The case for such upward harmonization, and linkage thereof
to trade as well, is exceptionally weak; and developing countries
have raised objections to it.
But the capture of these issues by "green" and "blue"
protectionists gives them great salience in the developed countries,
politicians and policy advocates into two camps: the free traders and free
immigrationists on one side and protectionists and anti-immigrationists on the
other, precisely because, as I argue in the text, free trade with the countries
containing paupers was considered to be similar in effect to free immigration
of the paupers themselves. In fact, free immigration was described as "free
trade in paupers" in that debate! See the discussion in Jagdish Bhagwati, "Free
Traders and Free Immigrationists: Strangers or Friends?", Russell sage
Foundation: New York, mimeographed, 1991. .
while the ability to hide behind the umbrella of "social causes" in
advancing these issues gives them the cachet of high moral ground.
In short, one almost sees the white man's burden being used to
advance the white man's interest; and one also sees, in the selection
of issues and the precise shape being given to them, the other cynical
reality: that stones are being (properly) thrown at other people's
glass houses by people who (improperly) construct fortresses around
their own.1
To put it yet another way, what one is beginning to see is
demands from developed countries now to introduce special
restrictions on trade of the developing countries. Ironically, just as
Special & Differential (S&D) Treatment in favour of the developing
countries has finally been greatly circumscribed as a GATT principle
after years of intellectual battle, we are now getting into Reverse
S&D, designed to work against the developing countries.
It will be a major task for economists, and free-trade-oriented
politicians, to confront these new problems. The main task will be to
keep arguing (what I believe is true)2 that the fears of
immiserization of the proletariat from freer trade with the South are
grossly exaggerated and therefore misplaced, that the real problem
has to do with technical change, that the policy which can help
address the issue is not protectionism but rather encouragement of
^Thus, the US itself has serious problems with its children: recent studies show
that over 4 million children live in great hazard and black children's infant
mortality rates and life expectancy are a matter of embarrassment for a
country of such relative affluence. Yet, the focus of our unions is on children
in developing countries, since that is where they think their competition
comes from.
2See Bhagwati and Kosters, ibid.
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widespread skill formation to diffuse the benefits of the technological
revolution that favours skills, and that such encouragement of
environmental and labour policies as we seek on other grounds
should be done, not by linking them to trade rights and access (which
will inevitably be captured by protectionists and those seeking to rip
off the developing countries instead of really wanting to improve and
help them), but by suasion as through subsidizing NGO activity and
by concerted, multilateral efforts at securing consensus on core
values and policies as desirable objectives to be aspired to..
(2) The Selfish Hegemon and Impact on Multilateralism:
The other question of some importance today is our attitude to
multilateralism, since we have recently come to embrace both
regionalism (FTA's more strictly) and aggressive unilateralism (via
301 actions).
Historically, our embrace of NAFTA was largely inspired by the
fact that the process of getting a multilateral negotiation at the GATT
started had stalled in 1982 when the EC refused to go along.1 In
essence, we then served notice that we would try alternative ways of
getting to worldwide freer trade, the chief one being the use of Free
Trade Areas (FTAs). The Canada-US FTA did work in the end to
jumpstart the GATT as the EC did turn around and agreed in 1986 to
the Uruguay Round, and to inclusion in the agenda of several of the
new issues such as Agriculture and Services. But the dynamic of
FTAs and their eventual packaging into regionalism has been such
Jagdish Bhagwati, "Jumpstarting the GATT". Foreign Policy. Summer 1991,
vol. 83.
that we have now pushed FTAs beyond Canada, and despite the
success of the Round and the GATT, to NAFTA and now seek to push
them beyond, to other countries.1
Similarly, we have become familiar with the use of Section 301
of the 1974 and 1988 trade Acts to issue trade threats to extract
concessions from other countries concerning all sorts of issues where
we unilaterally define and determine these other countries to be
indulging in "unreasonable", "unfair" trading practices, quite
regardless of whether any treaty-defined obligations exists on their
part to do so. This is what economists have now come to call
Aggressive Unilateralism.2
One might expect therefore, with the Uruguay Round almost
concluded, and the GATT triumphantly turning into the WTO, and
therefore there being no excuse to multiply inherently preferential
FTAs as a necessary way to liberalize free trade further, that the US
would cease and desist from further FTAs, especially of the regional
variety (with their potential for retaliatory Asian response and hence
for fragmentation of the world economy into blocs). Similarly, since
the strengthened Uruguay Round Dispute Settlement procedures
make the use of 301 actions to extract unilaterally-specified trade
concessions by other Contracting Parties more risky and almost
certainly GATT-illegal, especially in case of the actual use of tariff
retaliation, the use of aggressive unilateralism by the US would also
!See Jagdish Bhagwati, "Beyond NAFTA: Clinton's Trading Choices", Foreign
Policy, Summer 1993, vol. 91.
2See, for instance, the essays in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick (ed.),
Aggressive Unilateralism. Michigan University Press: Michigan, 1991, and
Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk, ibid.
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seem to be destined to become a relic of the past.
Yet, it would be a mistake to think that WTO-centered
multilateralism, uncluttered by FTAs (and regionalism) and 301
actions for unilateral extractions of trade concessions, will now
emerge triumphant. Instead, I fear that these new instrumentalities
will continue somehow in place. Why?
The reason is that, no matter why these policy options were
arrived at earlier, the United States cannot but see them now as
useful instruments for advancing her self-interest. I think that we
now confront a model of the Selfish Hegemon. just as my great
teacher Charles P. Kindleberger advanced the influential thesis of the
Altruistic Hegemon. Let me explain.
Kindleberger thought of the United States after the Second
World War as backing the GATT and the liberal international trading
regime as a "public good". Now, the United States has been for some
time in what Douglas Irwin and I have called the "diminished giant
syndrome", where it wants "finally" to "look after its own interest".1
The architectural approach to building a socially-productive, good-
for-all world trading system is at a discount as the United States
finds itself pursuing agendas defined more pointedly by domestic
interests.
Thus, we have witnessed the United States seeking excessive
intellectual property protection, and exploiting environmental and
labour issues to reduce competitive pressures. FTAs are then used as
. Jagdish Bhagwati and Douglas Irwin, "The Return of the Reciprocitarians:
U.S. Trade Policy Today", The World Economy. 1987; and also Jagdish Bhagwati,
Protectionism. MIT Press: Cambridge, 1988.
an incentive strategy1 and 301 is used as a punishment strategy to
bargain to advantage with individual, especially developing and
smaller, countries,2 to extract the best terms from the targetted
countries on these matters which are strategically characterized by
the interested lobbies as "linked" to trade.
While these favorable bargains are struck with specific
countries with the aid of the incentive and the punishment strategies
that I have identified, these are codified and enshrined eventually at
the GATT in a multilateral agreement (like the Uruguay Round) with
a divided, partially coopted and weakened opposition. If the US
were to go directly to the GATT and bargain directly with all, on the
other hand, she would extract a much inferior bargain. Thus, there
exists a symbiotic (and, for the hegemon, diminished as it is, a
productive) relationship between the new policies of FTAs and 301,
and multilateralism at the GATT or WTO, which favours a
continuation of United States embrace of these new policies.3
*I draw this idea from John Whalley who has recently asked why a hegemonic
power like the United States has created FTAs and found small countries like
Canada and Mexico to go along with it. He talks of the United States using
market access to itself as a way of extracting what he calls "side payments" that
presumably would not be possible to extract in multilateral negotiations right
out.
2Thus, facing the US in a one-on-one bargain, President Salinas had to accept
the worst possible terms on intellectual property protection, something which
the US could not extract at the GATT earlier. Then, the Mexican acceptance of
these outrageous terms was touted by the US as the "model" which others
should follow, with Special 301 threats and actions leveled at particularly
recalcitrant countries. In the end, the concessions so gained by the US at the
GATT on intellectual property protection were dramatically one-sided and
certainly excessive from a worldwide efficiency viewpoint, thanks to the
strategy that I have identified in the text.
3Thus, the proponents in Washington of the "GATT-plus" concept and phrase,
when they imply that regionalism, aggressive unilateralism and
multilateralism are simply different routes to freeing trade, each simply
separable from and additive to the others, forget this symbiotic relationship
among them. They are as naive as the proponents of the "marriage-plus" view
I suspect, in fact, that most lobbies, with their own agendas, are
now aware of these advantages of the FTA-cum-301 Selfish Hegemon
Strategy. Indeed, each domestic lobby now cites the previous one
that prevailed as a sound reason for the United States government to
extract concessions also for itself by use of the incentive and
punishment strategies that I have identified. Thus, the
environmentalists cite success in securing (for business) intellectual
property protection; the labour unions cite the progress by
environmentalists when seeking to impose labour standards on
others; and other lobbies will doubtless cite the labour union s,
efforts and prospective success, in turn.
I believe therefore that we are now likely to continue being
saddled with these instrumentalities (FTAs and unilateralism) even
though they violate the spirit of genuine multilateral negotiations,
fair and square, and indeed constitute violations in themselves of the
spirit (and, in case of unilateralism, also of the letter) of the
multilateralism enshrined in the GATT. It will be interesting to see
how the world trading system will evolve, as these new perceptions
and political realities shape US trade policy and intrude on the
working of the multilateral trading regime at the WTO.
turned out to be in Robert Redford and Demi Moore's film, An Indecent
Proposal,
\O
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